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Testing Trial Advocacy:
A Law Professor's Brief Life
as a Public Defender
Gary S. Gildin
Having taught trial advocacy for the past fourteen years, I embraced the
novel opportunity to test firsthand the techniques we offer in the classroom by
serving my sabbatical as an assistant public defender in Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania. Over the course of five trials and more than fifty hearings, I
endeavored to make effective use of those advocacy skills that I had urged
upon some 2,000 students. Except for the not wholly unexpected need to
adapt to the idiosyncracies of individualjudges, Professor Mauet's fundamental techniques generally could be directly (if not always successfully) employed
in the courtroom. There was one aspect of the litigation process, however, that
no textbook, lecture, simulation, or videotape could ever convey: the client. In
my semester as a public defender, I was confronted with an array of defendants whose plight defied reliance upon classic trial advocacy skills.
In the perhaps wan hope that my experiences can assist other teachers to
prepare their students for the real-life vagaries of trial advocacy, this article
attempts to categorize types of clients the criminal defense lawyer is likely to
encounter. It then offers modest suggestions for training the advocate to
address the problems posed by each class of clientele.1
The Defenseless Client
My first client, whom I initially found totally befuddling, displayed what
ultimately proved to be a not atypical profile-the client with no discernible
defense.
Having impressed upon legions of students that nothing in law is clear, I
could not believe that there was no viable defense to lodge on behalf of fiftyfive-year-old Lewis Stone. Mr. Stone had been caught leaving a grocery store
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with a five-dollar steak visibly protruding from underneath his shirt. He then
had given a complete and uncoerced confession admitting that he had stolen
it. Having an illustrious history of convictions for retail theft, Mr. Stone was
now facing a felony charge. Under a standard-range sentence dictated by
Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines, a conviction would render him a longterm resident of one of the state's correctional facilities.
Seeing no immediate defense on the facts, I turned my attention to the
constitutional doctrines relied upon with occasional success by the defendants
in my criminal procedure course. My quest proved fruitless. Where was the
raw material that would induce the jury to decide following the opening
statement, if not during jury selection, that Mr. Stone was innocent? How was
I to cross-examine unbiased eyewitnesses possessed of an unerring ability to
perceive, recollect, and discuss the events in question?
Having gleaned that most criminal cases are resolved by plea bargaining, I
set off to visit the district attorney in the faint hope that she perceived some
weakness in the case which would induce acceptance of a plea to a misdemeanor. I was able to extract one concession: she agreed to remain mute
at sentencing.

-

With guidance from my boss, I turned my attention to an aspect of persuasion generally not addressed in trial practice courses-sentencing advocacy.
The worst fate suffered by defendants found guilty in the Case Files of trial
advocacy courses is the bruised ego of the student advocate; there is no
occasion for the loser to attempt, at sentencing, to minimize the consequences of the jury's guilty verdict. But for the Mr. Stones of the world for
whom a guilty verdict is a foregone conclusion, the sole opportunity for
advocacy lies at sentencing-either formally following trial, or informally in
plea negotiations with the prosecution.
At this juncture opportunities for advocacy abound. In the case of Mr.
Stone, my preparation for the sentencing involved the mundane task of
gathering letters of support from a psychologist and a clergyman. While
supplying no cognizable defense to the charges, the letters suggested that Mr.
Stone would profit more from treatment than from incarceration. No sophisticated advocacy skill was involved either in gathering these letters or in using
them to argue for a mitigated sentence. Instead, my pitch at the sentencing
hearing was but a commonsense explanation why incarceration, particularly
for the length of time suggested by the sentencing guidelines, would be
inappropriate and counterproductive. Somewhat begrudgingly, the trial
judge agreed.
Sentencing advocacy is perhaps even more crucial at the plea-bargaining
stage, particularly where mandatory sentencing guidelines deprive the judge
of all discretion. If the defendant's activities can be linked to drug or alcohol
dependency, the district attorney may be persuaded to agree to a treatment
program in lieu of imprisonment.2 Even where the prosecutor refuses to
2.
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consent to diversion, advising the defendant to enter a treatment program
voluntarily while awaiting trial may benefit him at sentencing. Again, the skill
entailed in this sort of advocacy has nothing to do with law but has everything
to do with affording proper representation of the client who has no defense.
The Client Who Can't Be Put on the Stand
As vexing as the defenseless client is the accused whose defense cannot be
thoroughly placed before the jury because of a prior conviction. Law school
programs do equip aspiring advocates with the conceptual tools to represent
such a defendant: the presumption of innocence, the defendant's constitutional right not to testify, and the prosecution's burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt are bedrock principles that can be mustered.
There is a vast divide, however, between legal precepts and reality.
Harold Kelly, accused of knowing receipt of stolen property, was prepared
to testify he was unaware that the property he admittedly possessed had been
stolen. Regrettably, the price of relating his story to the jury would have been
introduction of his prior burglary convictions.
I drew upon the advocacy conventions that over the years I had proffered to
my students. During voir dire, I explained the legal protections afforded
anyone accused of a crime and attempted to extract a promise from the jurors
to apply these tenets as they scrutinized the prosecution's case against Mr.
Kelly. Thejurors were reminded of their pledge during my opening statement
and closing argument, and for the fourth time in the judge's charge. 3 My
admittedly biased assessment of the evidence was that the prosecution plainly
had failed to meet its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr.
Kelly knew that the property had been stolen. The jury disagreed. The case
exemplified the futility of relying upon incantations of presumptions of innocence and burdens of proof, and the imperative of offering the jury a competing defense theory of the case. But what is the theory to be when the defendant cannot testify and has no witnesses to support his claimed defense?
It is settled lore that a factual theory of the case must not only present a
cogent story of what happened but should offer further explanation, consistent with the jurors' commonsense expectations, of why the events occurred.
Upon reflection, I realized that a legal theory of the case resting principally on
the prosecution's inability to satisfy its burden of proof also should propose
why the prosecution had failed to garner the evidence ajury would expect if
the defendant were guilty.
In Mr. Kelly's case, the arresting officer had absolutely no knowledge of
how Mr. Kelly came into possession of the stolen property and essentially
conducted no investigation once he discovered that the property was stolen.
Would the jurors have been more amenable to finding the Commonwealth's
proof inadequate had they been persuaded that the officer could have and
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should have done more-or at least done something-to find out how the
defendant came to possess the stolen goods? Absent a factual hook on which
to hang its understanding of the burden of proof, the jury was left to choose
between assessing the evidence against empty legal formalisms and assessing
the evidence against the only human placed before it, the defendant. Not
surprisingly, the jury chose to evaluate the defendant and, not hearing him
speak in his defense, found him wanting.
The Vacillating Client
I had expected surprise prosecution witnesses, failures of recollection from
my own witnesses, even objections emanating from the bench (always, of
course, sustained). I was entirely unprepared for the client who, unlike the
inanimate defendants in the Case Files, seemed to change stories with whatever winds were prevailing.
The most dramatic example was Betsy Dennis, who stood accused of extorting hundreds of dollars by sending letters threatening physical harm to the
complainant. Over the course of several interviews, Ms. Dennis steadfastly
denied writing any note, much less receiving money from the victim.
While the prosecution presented its case, I quietly asked Ms. Dennis, seated
next to me at counsel table, to write out the text of the extortion note just
introduced by the district attorney. Even for one professing no expertise in
graphology, the note left little room to question that Ms. Dennis's protestation
of innocence was untrue. I slid the handwriting sample into my suitcoat
pocket, deferring for the moment resolution of the evolving ethical dilemma.
As the prosecution announced it was resting its case, Ms. Dennis turned to
me in tears and whispered, "I can't do this anymore. I wrote the note and took
the money." I mentally reviewed my ethical obligations. My first thought was
that this was cruel revenge for having vexed my first-year students with the
lawyer's trilemma. 4 My ethical dilemma was soon resolved: during a brief
recess, Ms. Dennis volunteered her confession to everyone in the hallway.
There were less egregious instances of the vacillating client: the man who
agreed to plead guilty, only to change his mind on the morning of trial; the
accused who over the course of successive interviews recalled additional facts
that alternated between compelling and condemning; the client whose wife
was prepared to be the star defense witness one moment and in the next
breath threatened to be the chief witness for the prosecution. In the dynamic
representation of actual clients, new versions of the facts may descend without
warning. To my knowledge, no trial advocacy tome has been written that can
adequately prepare students or teachers for the twists and turns of the client's
needs, desires, and recollections. Nor have my firsthand experiences provided
any magical formula for coping with such surprises beyond the necessity of
maintaining a poker face when adversity strikes at trial. But those of us who
train young advocates should continually stress the self-contradictory
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adage: expect the unexpected. And we should contrive little surprises in our
training materials.
The Client in Name Only
The most disappointing aspect of my foray into the public defense was my
frequent inability to cultivate a bona fide relationship with my client. The fact
that the public defender is foisted upon the defendant rather than voluntarily
retained as counsel certainly degrades the attorney-client bond at the outset.
The bond is further strained when conditions, largely beyond the control of
defense counsel, make the defendant feel that his counsel is simply a cog in
the machinery processing him towards incarceration.
Perhaps nowhere are the circumstances less fostering of a textbook attorney-client relationship than in preliminary hearings, which in Pennsylvania
generally are held before laypersons elected as districtjustices. On a good day,
defense counsel will have seen the criminal complaint before arriving at the
hearing. Only on extremely rare occasions will counsel have spoken to the
defendant before meeting him at the districtjustice's office.
Typically the district justices schedule hearings every fifteen minutes, although often multiple hearings are scheduled for the same time. In each
fifteen-minute slot, counsel is expected to interview the client as to the facts of
the case and as to circumstances that may be relevant to reduction of bail;
prepare for the hearing; cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; argue why
the Commonwealth has not established the elements of the crime; advocate
for reduction of bail; and, assuming the defendant is bound over for trial,
explain to the client the next stages of the process. Although fifteen minutes is
woefully inadequate, the districtjustice, pressured by an overcrowded docket,
continually sends emissaries to interrupt the initial client conference and urge
counsel to act with greater dispatch. Most clients leave the preliminary hearing confused about what has happened and equally befuddled as to what
comes next.
This assembly-line justice is repeated during arraignments and pretrial
conferences; it was not atypical for me to represent twenty clients in one
morning.5 Client counseling consisted of whispered conversations in the lockup (in the presence of fellow inmates), in the hallways, or at the bar while the
judge simultaneously ran through a recitation of defendant's rights.
The instances when I felt satisfied with my representation and counseling
were the handful of cases that proceeded to trial. The overwhelming majority
of defendants who pleaded guilty, even when the ultimate disposition was
quite favorable, felt that they had simply been led through the criminaljustice
system to a destination marked Guilty. Many directedjustifiable frustration at
the attorney, who seemed more foe than zealous advocate.

5.
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The defendant ever grateful for his attorney's good counsel is more common in fiction than in fact. Though the defense counsel's duties to the client
may be clear in theory, in practice they become muddied, complex, inconstant, and at times adversarial. Students somehow must be trained to fight
consciously and determinedly against the constant pressures of judges and
other court functionaries who, concerned principally with controlling the
docket, seek to pressure defense counsel into expedition. An attorney who
acquiesces will leave the client feeling victimized rather than adequately
represented.

The Innocent Client
Thus far I have painted a rather dismal portrait of the public defender's
clientele. The reward, of course, is the opportunity to represent the very
person whom the structure and rules of the criminal justice system are designed to protect-the genuinely innocent client.
I came to my sabbatical quite clear on the theory that explains the role of
defense counsel. Once a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the prosecution
is forced to override the presumption of innocence by proving each and every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Our system would rather
find ninety-nine guilty persons innocent than wrongfully convict one innocent person. As a practical man, however, I approached my sabbatical with a
certain skepticism. Would there be, in fact, truly innocent persons wrongfully
accused of crimes?
Even discounting for the inability to shed the advocate's cloak, I found that
the number of innocent defendants exceeded my expectations. Even when
the police are acting entirely in good faith, they may lodge criminal charges
without fully and carefully investigating all the circumstances of the crime.
The probable-cause threshold for initiating criminal charges guarantees that
there will be a certain percentage of persons charged who are, in fact,
innocent.
Frankly, the most stressful moments of my brief career as a public defender
were the trials of persons I was convinced were not guilty. Seldom have I seen
anyone more ashen than a man facing a trial for a crime he insists he has not
committed. Rarely have I felt so at loss for words as in trying to explain how it
can be possible for an innocent person to confront ajail term. And never have
I felt more satisfaction in my legal career than in watching a client walk out of
the courtroom a free man.

It is difficult in the context of a trial advocacy course to explain how, as a
criminal defense counsel, one can maintain perspective and enthusiasm over
years of representing clients who inspire little or no respect, affection, or trust.
By the same token, it is impossible to convey to students the enormous
responsibility and sense of satisfaction of providing the best possible defense
to the truly innocent. And yet it is the teacher's duty to explore the criminal
defense counsel's obligation to afford the same vigorous representation to
guilty and innocent clients alike.
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My sabbatical with the public defender's office has had a profound impact
on my own teaching of trial advocacy. I am more convinced than ever that we
must include basic skills of trial advocacy in the curriculum to equip students
to provide effective assistance of counsel, whether as plaintiffs attorney,
prosecutor, or defense counsel. And I think we must try harder to prepare
them for the surprises, the frustrations, and even the despair that they will
encounter when live clients replace the cadavers of the Case File.

